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AbstrAct
This paper offers for the first time income shares of the top 10% and the 
bottom 40% of the labour force for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela in the period 1900-2011. The main findings are: i) over this 
period the top 10% share is, on average, 51.3% and the bottom 40% share 
13.2%; ii) in the last thirty years the gap between both tails widened (54.6% 
vs. 11.9%), despite narrowing inequality in the 2000s; iii) there is no inequality 
levelling in the middle decades of the last century as experienced in the rich 
economies. This new long-term evidence confirms that the recent shared de-
cline in inequality has no precedent in the 20th century; but it also shows that, 
as in the past, high concentration at the top 10% and a relatively low-income 
share of the bottom 40% continues to be the region’s inequality trademark.1
Keywords: Economic History; Economic Development; Income Inequality; 
Latin America.
1 I am grateful to Valpy FitzGerald, Branko Milanovic, Javier Rodríguez Weber, Diego Sanchez Ancochea 
and two anonymous referees for their comments. During the assembling of the wage database that 
supports this work I received generous help from Florencia Aráoz, Leticia Arroyo Abad, Raymundo 
Campos Vázquez, Matín Cuesta, José Díaz, Ewout Frankema, María Gómez León, María López 
Uribe, Gerardo Lucas, Oscar Nupia, Mario Matus, Brian McBeth, Marco Palacios, Eustáquio Reis, 
Javier Rodríguez Weber, Carmen A. Romero, Héctor Valecillos, Henry Willebald, Jeffrey Williamson, 
and Alan Wittrup (ILO). This research has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy, project ECO2015-65049-C2-2-P: (MINECO/FEDER, UE).
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resumen
Este trabajo ofrece por primera vez estimaciones para las participaciones 
del ingreso del 10% superior y el 40% inferior de la fuerza de trabajo en 
Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, México y Venezuela durante el período de 
1900-2011. Los principales hallazgos son: i) en este período el 10% superior 
recibió, en promedio, el 51,3% del ingreso y el 40% inferior el 13,2%; ii) en 
los últimos treinta años la brecha entre los dos grupos se amplió (54,6% vs. 
11,9%), a pesar de una menor desigualdad en la primera década de este siglo; 
iii) no hay una tendencia a la igualdad en las décadas intermedias del siglo 
veinte como la experimentada en las economías ricas. Esta nueva evidencia 
sobre el largo plazo confirma que la reciente tendencia compartida de reduc-
ción en la desigualdad no tiene precedentes en el siglo veinte; pero también 
muestra que, como en el pasado, una alta concentración del ingreso en los de 
arriba y una participación relativamente baja de los de abajo continúa siendo 
un rasgo distintivo de la región.
Keywords: Historia económica; Desarrollo económico; Desigualdad del in-
greso, América Latina.
Clasificación JEL: N36, O15, O54, J31.  
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1. introDuction
The study of the concentration of income at the top of the distribution is 
gaining ground in the inequality literature. Recent outcomes are placed in a 
historical perspective by the construction of distribution tables based on tax 
records (Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014). A key finding of this research is 
that concentration at the top in the rich economies at the start of the 21st cen-
tury is approaching those levels seen in the Belle Epoch, reversing the “Great 
Leveling” of the period 1913-1970 (Lindert and Williamson, 2016). In Latin 
America the focus of the discussion has been on the, largely shared, narrowing 
inequality trend in the 2000s or so (e.g., Gasparini et al., 2011; López Calva 
and Lustig, 2010); the sustainability of which is in doubt after the end of the 
latest commodity boom. But there has also been increasing attention focused 
on top incomes from an historical perspective at a country level (Alvaredo, 
2010; Souza and Medeiros, 2015; Rodríguez Weber, 2015). These studies 
point to a relatively high historical income concentration at the top, as well as 
to the dominance of a rising or constant trend since 2000 or so – in contrast 
to the downward trend in the household Ginis.2
Following this line of inquiry, this paper offers for the first time income 
shares for the top 10% and the bottom 40% of the labour force for Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela (LA-6) for the period 1900-
2011.3 These countries accounted for about three-quarters of the population 
of Latin America over the last century and thus are representative of the region 
as a whole. To that purpose, income estimates for fixed shares of the economi-
cally active population (EAP) are derived from dynamic occupational tables 
based on four occupational skills groups constructed in Astorga (2015, 2016). 
The estimation of income largely relies on wage data, but it also makes allow-
ances for non-labour income. Because of data and methodology limitations, 
2 For instance, top 1% shares of above 25% in Chile 1913-1938, and around 20% in 1938-1970 
(Rodríguez-Weber, 2015 – based on dynamic social tables); and 15%, on average, in Argentina in 
1932-1972 (Alvaredo, 2010 –3, based on income tax records). For a more recent period, Alvaredo 
and Londoño (2013) report a rising trend in the top 1% share in Argentina in 1997-2004; and in 
Colombia in 2000-2010, reaching 20% by 2010 – a similar order of magnitude as in the US. And 
Souza and Medeiros (2015) find that the Gini coefficient in Brazil remains stable in the period 2006-
2012 after correcting for the underestimation of top incomes.
3 My data do not allow for the estimation of the top 1% income share with any level of accuracy; 
nor do they inform about the split between labour and property income in the top 10% share, nor 
examine the rural-urban divide.
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income shares reported here are necessarily crude approximations of their 
true values, but they can inform about secular trends on both tails of the dis-
tribution. They also have the advantage of offering a consistent multi-country 
view spanning decades with no official household surveys and where income 
tax records, if available at all, are of limited use owing to pervasive tax avoid-
ance and evasion.4
Focusing on the top 10% is justified as this decile usually shows a contrast-
ing behaviour when compared to the D9 decile; a contrast that is especially 
acute in Latin America.5 The bottom 40% income share – dominated by the 
unskilled – has been overlooked in the long-term inequality literature largely 
because of data limitations (the poor do not file tax returns). This is unfortu-
nate, as the income take of this group is of paramount importance for assess-
ing the distributional impact of development. Indeed, the World Bank is now 
focusing officially on the outcome of the bottom 40% of the population in its 
assessment of welfare and inequality.
A key finding is that over the period 1900-2011 the top 10% income share 
averaged 51.3% and the bottom 40% share 13.2%, and that in the last thirty 
years the gap between both tails has widened (54.6% vs. 11.9%) despite nar-
rowing trends in the 2000s. But both shares are far from constant and present 
important differences across countries. The underlying trend of the occupa-
tional structure is one of substantial social mobility and educational advances 
– in line with rising living standards – with a significant reduction in the labour 
share of the unskilled. However, skills upgrading has not been enough to alter 
significantly concentration at the top, or the income share of those at the bot-
tom of the distribution in the LA-6. The combination of social mobility with a 
persistently high gap between both tails is largely the result of increases in the 
wage of the unskilled lagging behind advances in the overall average income. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summa-
rises the methodology used to construct the distribution tables and briefly 
discusses underlying trends in the EAP and income ratios. Section 3 examines 
the trajectories of the top 10% and the bottom 40% income shares based on 
summary statistics and country charts. Section 4 offers concluding remarks. 
An Appendix includes tables with labour shares and income ratios by decades 
as well as details on estimation procedure and sources.
4 Owing to word limitations, here I offer a partial account of the distribution outcome based on 
fixed-EAP shares. A more detailed and extensive paper is forthcoming, including more attention to 
developments in the middle group and the role played by fundamental variables.
5 According to Palma (2011) the Latin American average D10 in 2005 was 41.8%, compared to the 
average D9 of 15.8%. And the range on the income share of D9 in a sample of 135 countries in that 
year only expanded across 4.5 percentage points (from 13.2% to 17.7%), whereas D10 had a range 
ten times larger (20.8% to 65%). Also, the D10 tends to be highly correlated with overall personal 
income Ginis (Leigh, 2007; Székely and Hilgert, 1999).
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2. occupAtion-bAseD income groups
The starting point is the construction of dynamic distribution tables for 
the LA-6 based on estimates of income for four occupational groups, following 
the methodology in FitzGerald (2008).6 For each country the EAP is divided 
into four groups: Group 1 (employers, managers, and professionals), Group 2 
(technicians and administrators), Group 3 (semi-skilled blue collars workers, 
other urban workers in relatively low productivity sectors such as retailing and 
transport, and artisans), and Group 4 (rural workers and personal services – 
including domestic servants – plus unskilled urban workers). To ensure consist-
ency with the overall EAP series, the labour force in Group 3 is calculated as a 
residual.7 The groups’ sizes change over time in response to developments in 
skills formation, demography, and living standards (Astorga et al., 2005). The 
distribution of income per occupational category is defined as:
(1)
where ei is the EAP share of group i and ri is the ratio of the mean income 
of group i to the mean income for the EAP as a whole (i.e., income per person 
engaged). The income share of each group (si) is obtained as eiri.
The overall measure of income per person engaged reflects, where possi-
ble, the personal income concept of the national accounts (see Appendix). For 
the last thirty years or so there is enough data to account for net taxes. This 
is more problematic for the previous years, but in any case there was limited 
redistribution via direct transfers in the region during most of the 20th century 
(Goñi et al., 2011). I am not considering the distributive impact of social spend-
ing (e.g., health and education). It has risen throughout the region since the 
1980s, though exhibiting high volatility and following the swings in economic 
activity (Arroyo Abad and Lindert, 2016).
Ideally, income estimates should make allowances for the subsistence 
economy. However, there is little systematic and consistent evidence of the 
size of the subsistence economy (particularly important in the early decades 
of the 20th century), which could be used to make an adjustment (Berg, 1970). 
To the extent that the population in the subsistence sector is included in the 
population census, I am assigning them an income equal to the unskilled wage. 
6 This method is akin to the construction of dynamic social tables (combining benchmark years from 
census data with annual data on income from other sources) used for Uruguay (Bértola, 2005), Chile 
(Rodríguez Weber, 2014), Brazil (Gómez León, 2016), and pre-industrial societies (Milanovic et al., 
2010; Lindert and Williamson, 1982). 
7 The labour shares of the four groups during the period 1950-2011 are estimated by aggregating 
categories for the distribution of the EAP by occupational categories sourced from the International 
Labor Organization (ILO). To complete the shares back from 1950 to 1900 I rely on changes in three 
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This share is likely to capture distributed property income and rents for all the 
EAP, together with earnings from highly paid workers.8 Because of the way it is 
calculated, s1 may be subject to a significant margin of error. However, in 
general, my estimates for the mean income of this group in the first half of the 
20th century are consistent with data available on top earners (Astorga, 2015). 
                                                
7 The labour shares of the four groups during the period 1950-2011 are estimated by aggregating 
categories for the distribution of the EAP by occupational categories sourced from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). To complete the shares back from 1950 to 1900 I rely on 
changes in three indicators constructed by FitzGerald (2008). See Astorga (2015, Annex C) for 
more details. 
8 The long-term evidence in developed economies (Piketty, 2014) shows that income from 
property tends to be concentrated in the top group, which means that the understatement of 
property income of the middle and bottom groups is small. Natural resource rents - particularly 
important in Chile and Venezuela - are included to the extent that they are reflected in personal 
income, but not when they were used to finance publicly provided services. 
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Also difficult to obtain for most of the period are differences in employment 
levels across occupational groups. My calculation in each category assumes 
full-time pay rates and that unemployment was affecting all categories equally.
The income share for Group 1 (s1) is calculated as a residual by subtracting 
the income shares for the other three groups:
(2) 
This share is likely to capture distributed property income and rents for 
all the EAP, together with earnings from highly paid workers.8 Because of the 
way it is calculated, s1 may be subject to a significant margin of error. However, 
in general, my estimates for the mean income of this group in the first half of 
the 20th century are consistent with data available on top earners (Astorga, 
2015). To estimate mean income of the remaining three occupational groups 
I rely on wage series assembled to reflect differences in skills (see Appendix). 
No allowances are made for fringe earnings (e.g., overtime pay and productiv-
ity bonuses). However, Eriksson (1966) found that in Chile, Colombia and Ven-
ezuela in the middle decades of the last century skills differentials measured 
by total remuneration were either close to or greater than those measured in 
basic wages. 
There is a potential bias when estimating s1 according to (2). Since the aver-
age wage is taken as a proxy for average earnings of the three lower income 
groups (without discriminating between the employed and the unemployed in 
each group’s EAP), at times of high unemployment, my series will overestimate 
r2, r3, r4 and underestimate r1 (as this is calculated as a residual) and thus 
underestimate the top-group share. This problem can be especially relevant 
during the early years of the Great Depression or during the outbreak of the 
Debt Crisis in the 1980s. In order to minimise the potential impact of this bias, 
I calculate deviations of the unemployment rate (when available) from an as-
sumed long-term rate (as a proxy for the natural rate of unemployment) and 
then adjust my overall income per person engaged series accordingly.
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix presents a summary of the EAP shares 
and relative income ratios by decades. Differences among the countries’ EAP 
shares are largely driven by variations in the urbanisation process, the timing 
of the structural change, and improvements in the education level of the labour 
8 The long-term evidence in developed economies (Piketty, 2014) shows that income from property 
tends to be concentrated in the top group, which means that the understatement of property income 
of the middle and bottom groups is small. Natural resource rents – particularly important in Chile and 
Venezuela – are included to the extent that they are reflected in personal income, but not when they 
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force.9 Broadly speaking, Argentina and Chile already had significant urban 
populations by 1900 reflected in relatively lower values for the economically 
active persons in Group 4 dominated by low paid workers in rural areas; where-
as, according to these estimates, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela start-
ed the 20th century with shares for that group between 65% and 75%. All six 
countries had inflection points (preceding acceleration) in population growth in 
the 1930s and in urbanisation in the 1940s (earlier in Argentina).10
The relative income ratios for the top group tend to show high and rising 
values during the first half of the last century (especially in Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela) and then a decline in the second half. The rising trend 
suggests a growing share of property income as a proportion of total income 
(though I lack the data to confirm this) and slow increases in the number of top 
earners. The falling trend reflects an increase in the numbers of EAP in that 
group after 1960 or so in line with better access to education and a rapid in-
crease in income per person engaged between 1950 and 1970 in most coun-
tries (raising the denominator of the ratio). 
Meanwhile, the ratios of the bottom group are dominated by a steady de-
cline over the century. This is largely the result of increases in the wage of the 
unskilled lagging behind advances in the overall average income. Trends in the 
ratios of the two middle categories show mixed results. In most cases, the 
mean income of skilled workers (r2) kept pace with the average income for the 
whole labour force, resulting in stable ratios. By contrast, the relative ratios of 
semi-skilled labour are dominated by a moderate falling long-term trend.   
3. fixeD-eAp income shAres 
The next task is to derive an income distribution with fixed EAP shares 
for the top 10% (T10), the middle 50% (M50), and the bottom 40% (B40) 
from the above distribution structure with changing occupational shares. When 
e1=0.1 (Group 1’s EAP share) and e4=0.4 (Group 4’s) there is no need to real-
locate EAP between the original occupational categories to obtain the three 
income shares. When this is not the case, an adjustment is needed involving 
two steps: first, identifying the part of the EAP that needs to be reallocated; 
second, assigning an appropriate income ratio to calculate its corresponding 
income contribution.
9 According to Barro and Lee (2011) the average years of schooling in Argentina was 4.9 years in 
1950, 7.3 years in 1980 and 9.5 years in 2010. The same figures in Brazil are 2.1, 3 and 7.9; in 
Chile 3.7, 7 and 9.8; in Colombia 2.3, 4.9 and 9; in Mexico 2.2, 4.9 and 8.8; in Venezuela 1.6, 5.3 
and 8.4.
10 The urbanisation rates in the 1920s and the 1970s are respectively: 38% and 81% in Argentina, 
15% and 62% in Brazil, 38% and 79% in Chile, 15% and 61% in Colombia; 15% and 63% in 
Mexico, 24% and 76% in Venezuela (Astorga et al., 2005).
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For T10:
(3)  s10 = e1*r1 + (0.1 – e1)*r1under,        if e1 ≥ 0.1;
    s10 = e1*r1 + e2*r2 + (0.1 – e1 – e2)*r2under,  if e1 < 0.1;
where r1under and r2under are the average relative income ratios of those in-
dividuals who are outside the top decile of the labour force in Group 1 and 
Group 2 respectively. When e1 > 0.1 part of Group1´s EAP needs to be moved 
to the middle 50% and its corresponding income contribution calculated as 
(0.1 – e1)*r1under. And when e1 < 0.1 part of e2 needs to be reallocated so as to 
complete the top10% of the EAP, and its corresponding income contribution 
calculated as e2*r2 + (0.1 – e1 – e2)*r2under.
For B40:
(4)  s40 = e4*r4 + (0.4 – e4)*r3under,  if e4 ≤ 0.4;
    s40 = e4*r4 + (0.4 – e4)*r4over,   if e4 > 0.4;
where r3under is the average relative income ratio of those in Group 3 who 
are included in the bottom four deciles of the labour force, and r4over is the 
average relative income ratio of those in Group 4 who are outside the bottom 
four deciles.
M50 is calculated as a residual:
(5)  s50 = 1 – s10 – s40.
Ideally, the estimation of the over and under average relative ratios requires 
the income distribution within groups. In the absence of such information, r4over 
and r3under are calculated as the simple average of r3 and r4 (which in effect is the 
average of the semi and unskilled wage). Equally, r2under is proxied by the simple 
average of r2 and r3 (skilled and semi-skilled wage). For r1under – only needed, 
if at all, in the last two decades or so – the ratio of D9/D10 from household 
surveys is used (where typical values for the LA-6 are around 0.4).11 Because 
of relatively low wage premiums between groups 2 and group 3 (average of 1.6 
for the LA-6 over the whole period) and groups 3 and 4 (an average of 2), the 
additional margin of error introduced by using the single averages of adjacent 
income ratios is small. The potential distortions could be larger when estimat-
ing r1under, but in this case there is good quality data to make the adjustment.
12
3.1. top 10% AnD bottom 40% income shAres 
Table 1 summarises results for T10, M50, and B40, as well as the ratio T10/
B40 (equivalent to the Palma ratio) for the six countries and the LA-6 in the whole 
11 The periods when e1 ≥ 0.1 are: Argentina after 1988, Chile after 1975, Colombia after 2002, 
Mexico after 2004, and Venezuela after 1973.  The periods when e4 ≤ 0.4 are: Brazil after 1986, 
Chile after 1943, Colombia after 1980, Mexico after 1981, and Venezuela after 1956.
12 For instance, a sensitivity analysis shows that a 10% reduction in the D9/D10 ratio (i.e., wider gap 
between both deciles) results in an extra 0.1 percentage points for LA-6 average of s10 over the whole 
period, and 0.2pp in 1980-2011; whereas a 10% rise in the average r3 and r4 ratios (i.e., increasing 
dispersion in low skilled wages) results in a cut of 0.3pp in LA-6 average of s40 over the whole period, 
and a 0.5pp rise in 1980-2011. 
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period and the sub-periods 1900-1940, 1940-1980, and 1980-2011. The circa 
years of 1940 and 1980 correspond to inflexion points (preceding an acceleration 
in the first date, and levelling off in the second) in the series of GDP per capita, 
literacy, and urbanisation in the LA-6 (Astorga et al., 2005). This periodisation 
also reflects the adoption of particular growth strategies, and follows a tradition 
of economic historians studying the region (e.g., Bulmer-Thomas, 2005; Thorp, 
1998).13 The table also includes the coefficient of variation to measure dispersion 
by country in the three share series over the four periods, and in the LA-6 average.
In general, over the long run the region has exhibited high inequality, both in 
terms of high concentration at the top and a relatively low share of the bottom 
40%. The average shares for the LA-6 over the whole period are 51.3% for T10 
and 13.2% for B40 (and a Palma ratio of 3.9). The region’s T10 long-term average 
is above the 50% “high inequality” outcome estimated by Piketty in US around 
2010 and in Europe around 1910 (Piketty, 2014, Table 7.3). But a crucial differ-
ence is that the LA-6 as a group did not experience the inequality levelling seen in 
the rich economies, particularly in the period 1940-1970. At the bottom end of 
the distribution, the LA-6’s B40 long-term average (13.2%) is below the average 
16.6% reported in Palma (2011) for a sample of 133 countries in 2005.
tAble 1: fixeD-eAp income shAres, 1900-2011
LA-6: simple averages; 1900-2011 and 1900-1940 exclude Mexico prior to 1920. Mexico 1900-
2011 and 1900-40 start in 1920.
13 Roughly speaking, 1900-1940 includes the end of the first globalization wave (about 1860-
1915) and the transition years of the 1920s and 1930s; 1940-1980 the core years of state-led 
industrialisation years under protection (ISIS); and 1980-2011 the second wave of export-led growth 
accompanied with a trade liberalisation and market-friendly reforms (in some countries such as 
Chile and Argentina starting in the 1970s). Alternative cut-off points in 1935 and 1975 do not alter 
significantly the results shown in Table 1.
T10 M50 B40 T10/B40 T10 M50 B40 T10 M50 B40 T10/B40 T10 M50 B40
(ratio) (ratio)
 Argentina 51.8 33.2 15.0 3.5 0.08 0.12 0.13 52.9 31.9 15.2 3.5 0.08 0.12 0.11
 Brazil 49.2 38.9 11.9 4.1 0.14 0.15 0.34 42.7 45.2 12.1 3.5 0.09 0.10 0.30
 Chile 55.1 32.1 12.8 4.3 0.11 0.13 0.24 52.8 31.6 15.6 3.4 0.08 0.13 0.14
 Colombia 53.6 34.3 12.2 4.4 0.10 0.15 0.15 49.6 39.2 11.2 4.4 0.09 0.11 0.19
 Mexico 51.8 33.5 14.7 3.5 0.12 0.12 0.24 44.8 35.3 19.9 2.2 0.10 0.11 0.08
 Venezuela 46.5 41.7 11.8 3.9 0.11 0.15 0.25 44.1 46.2 9.7 4.6 0.08 0.07 0.07
 LA-6 51.3 35.5 13.2 3.9 0.11 0.14 0.22 48.3 37.9 13.8 3.5 0.09 0.11 0.15
 coeff. variation 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.27
 Argentina 51.2 32.9 15.9 3.2 0.08 0.08 0.14 51.0 35.4 13.7 3.7 0.09 0.11 0.08
 Brazil 51.4 34.6 13.9 3.7 0.10 0.08 0.31 54.5 36.7 8.7 6.2 0.08 0.08 0.19
 Chile 53.4 34.0 12.5 4.3 0.13 0.14 0.19 60.2 30.1 9.7 6.2 0.04 0.07 0.07
 Colombia 56.0 31.7 12.3 4.6 0.08 0.12 0.11 55.5 31.2 13.3 4.2 0.06 0.08 0.07
 Mexico 52.7 33.3 14.1 3.7 0.10 0.12 0.14 55.5 32.6 11.9 4.7 0.06 0.11 0.20
 Venezuela 45.7 42.2 12.1 3.8 0.10 0.14 0.28 50.7 35.0 14.3 3.5 0.12 0.12 0.14
 LA-6 51.7 34.8 13.5 3.8 0.10 0.11 0.19 54.6 33.5 11.9 4.6 0.07 0.10 0.12
 coeff. variation 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.19
1940-1980 1980-2011
1900-2011 1900-1940
(share %) (coefficient of var.) (share %) (coefficient of var.)
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Other outcomes to highlight are that the average top-bottom ratio widens 
across the three sub-periods, from 3.5 to 3.8 and, then to 4.6;14 and that in-
equality worsens between the start and the end of the 20th century (not shown 
in Table 1): the average in the LA-6 for T10 and B40 around 1900 were 46.3% 
and 13.8% respectively; by 2000 they were 54.4% and 11.7%. The informa-
tion provided by the coefficient of variation by country and period shows a 
contrast between a more volatile trajectory for B40 than T10 or M50 in all 
four periods.15 But, in all six countries and in the three shares the period 1980-
2011 tend to have the lowest volatility. It is also interesting to notice that, when 
compared with the whole period, the distribution in the last 30 years is both 
more polarised within countries (i.e., higher T10/B40 ratios) and homogeneous 
across countries (lower LA-6 coefficients of variation for the three shares).
Additional statistics indicate that fluctuations in T10 are negatively cor-
related with those in M50 (an average -0.87 pair correlation for the LA-6 over 
the whole period) and in B40 (-0.41). This indicates that relative gains/losses 
at the top were at the expense/benefit of, first, the middle group, and then, 
the bottom group. The LA-6 correlation between M50 and B40 over the whole 
period is low (-0.04) but with mixed signs by country: positive in Chile (0.34), 
and Mexico (0.32); close to zero in Argentina; and negative in Brazil (-0.11), 
Colombia (-0.23), and Venezuela (-0.57).
3.2. by-country outcome AnD compArison with AlternAtive estimAtes 
Figure 1 presents annual T10 and B40 series for the six countries. For 
the more recent decades it includes both the top 10% and the bottom 40% 
shares of the population based on official household surveys (D10 and D1-D4 
respectively). In addition, it shows alternative historical estimates with more 
detailed information than mine: Bértola et al. (2010) in 1920 for Brazil and 
Chile based on population census, and Argentina (under some assumptions); 
Rodríguez Weber (2015) for Chile circa 1902, 1934 and 1968 using dynam-
ic social tables; Londoño (1995) for Colombia in 1938, 1950, 1964, 1971, 
and1988 using a combination of national accounts data and employment and 
household surveys; Mexico in various years between 1950 and 1977 using 
data from official surveys (not always fully compatible) reported in Hernández 
and Córdoba (1979); Baptista (1997) between 1975 and 1989 for Venezuela 
based on official surveys covering only labour income.
There are important differences across countries and over time to highlight. 
Argentina and Colombia exhibit relatively more stable trajectories for B40; 
whilst Chile shows a more gradual decline of B40 and rising trend in T10 over 
the whole period. Brazil and Mexico are cases in which B40 switches from a 
14 The LA-6 averages for 1980-2000 are 55.8% for T10 and 11.8% for B40, and a Palma ratio of 4.7. 
15 However, the average standard deviation (absolute dispersion) for LA-6 over the whole period is 
0.06 in T10 and 0.03 in B40.
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high to a lower level during the second half of the last century. A relatively low 
T10 and high B40 share in Brazil up to 1950 are likely to reflect a distribu-
tional structure of a largely rural society – although, already by 1920, there 
was a significant presence of blue collar workers in Rio de Janeiro and São 
Paulo (Owensby, 1999, 29) – dominated by unskilled labour and with a low 
mean income per capita.16
Mexico shows an exceptional rise in B40 over the two decades following 
the Revolution.17 This was followed by a sudden drop in this share in the 1940s 
and a peak in T10. This outcome is associated with the surge of business op-
portunities in the country created by the war effort in the US amid subdued 
wages, boosting T10 partly at the expense of B40. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
favourable minimum wage policies and high unionisation rates contributed to 
a long spell of wage compression (Márquez Padilla, 1981) resulting in a rising 
B40. 
In general, the 1950s (later in Mexico) mark the beginning of a secular rise 
in the T10s that extends up to the 1990s (late in the 1970s in Argentina). This, 
together with a tendency for constant or declining trends in B40, resulted in 
a widening of the gap between both tails. Such an outcome can be associated 
with an acceleration of urbanisation and industrialisation generating downward 
pressures on unskilled wages (of increasingly urban workers), whilst relative 
skills scarcity boosted skill premiums. Institutional and demographic changes 
are also likely to have played their part in explaining the widening distribu-
tional gap in the closing decades of the last century. 
The military regimes in Argentina (1976-1983), Chile (1973-1990), and 
Brazil (1963-1980) effectively restricted – or banned – the action of unions, 
increased flexibility in the labour market, and reduced the coverage of the 
minimum wage as part of the reform agenda (Morley, 2000).18 More gener-
ally, unionisation plummeted across the region averaging only 10.7% of the 
workforce by 2005 compared to a peak of 23% in the 1970s (Roberts, 2012). 
ECLAC (2016) shows a 5.9% decline in the average real minimum wage for 
the LA-6 during the 1980s, followed by a moderate recovery of 1.7% annual 
increase in the 1990s. In addition, the delayed impact on the labour force of 
high population growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s (Argentina is the excep-
tion), together with increasing participations rates – particularly female rates 
16 According to the 1920 population census, about 80% of the labour force in Brazil was rural, 
illiterate, and low skilled (Bértola et al., 2009). Brazil’s income per capita around 1920 is estimated 
as a third of Argentina’s (Astorga et al., 2005). Recent outcomes in India and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(excluding Southern Africa), may offer a parallel to Brazil a century ago. In India T10 and B40 in 2005 
are about 32% and 19% respectively; and in Sub-Saharan Africa 34% and 15% (Palma, 2011).  My 
shares for Brazil around 1920 are 44% for T10 and 12% for B40, whilst those of Bértola et al. (2010) 
are 48% and 7% respectively.
17 The 1917 Constitution set new minimum wage levels as well as profit sharing. Higher real wages 
and living standards were priorities for the post-Revolution government (Bortz, 2005).
18 Indeed, in those periods under military juntas the Palma ratios reached extreme values: 4.6 in 
Argentina; 5.7 in Brazil; and 6.3 in Chile.
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– also undermined the unskilled wages and the share of the bottom 40%.19 
The effects of these underlying trends in the labour market were compounded 
by a wave of deregulation and privatisations that shifted a proportion of formal 
employment to an already large informal sector (PREALC, 1982).
Regarding a comparison with alternative historical estimates, Argentina in 
1920 shows similar gaps between both tails, but my shares are higher for T10 
(53% vs. 46%) and B40 (14% vs. 8%), implying a lower income weight for the 
middle groups in my estimates. Chile shows a matching rising trends in T10 to 
mid-1930s with the T10/B40 ratios relatively close to those estimated by Rod-
ríguez Weber. In Colombia, there is a dominance of a constant trend between 
1938 and 1988 for B40 in both estimates (also with similar levels). And there 
is coincidence in trends in the top tail, but my shares are consistently higher 
compared to Londoño´s in the period of 1938-1988 (on average, 55% vs. 
40%). In Venezuela, there is a coincidence in trends in T10 after 1980; whilst 
my B40 estimates show higher fluctuations. Baptista´s top-tail shares are con-
sistently lower (on average, 30.5% vs. 51%), which is to be expected, as his 
estimates are based on surveys covering only labour income.
Finally, the comparison of my shares and equivalent figures calculated from 
official household surveys shows two regularities. First, a coincidence in trends 
at both tails which gives some reassurances that the new historical estimates 
can be reasonably good proxies of distributional outcomes in decades without 
household surveys. In particular, the narrowing of the gap between both tails 
captures the impact of recent redistribution policies (largely in the 2000s) and 
developments in the labour market (e.g., lower unemployment and narrower 
skills premiums).20 Secondly, while B40 and D1-D4 show similar levels, T10 
is consistently above D10 in four of the six countries, suggesting a structural 
underestimation of the D10 in household surveys; a feature documented by 
Székely and Hilgert (1999) in a large sample of Latin American countries in 
the 1990s.
19 According to my calculations based on official figures, the population in the LA-6 (simple averages) 
grew 74% between 1950 and 1970, and 56% between 1970 and 1990. The corresponding growth 
rates for the EAP are 64% and 85%. The same calculations for the 1930-1950 period shows a 
more even process with population and EAP growth both at 57%. As to female participation rates, 
there were few changes in 1940-1970, and an explosive growth in participation from 1970 to 2000 
(Camou and Maubrigades, 2016).
20 Azevedo et al. (2013) looks at the factors behind the recent decline in income inequality in fourteen 
countries in the region (Venezuela is excluded). The key factor has been relatively strong growth in 
labour income for low-income workers. On average, 45% of the reduction in the Gini coefficient is 
attributed to this factor; whereas changes in government transfers contributed, on average, 14% and 
changes in pensions 7%.
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figure 1: top 10% AnD bottom 40% income shAres by country, 1900-2011
All five-years moving average shares.
Sources: for T10 and B40, Bértola et al. (2010) for Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 1920; Rodríguez 
Weber (2014) for Chile in 1902 (1900-05 average), 1934 (1929-35 average), 1968 (1965-71 
average); Londoño (1995) for Colombia in 1938, 50, 64, 71, 78, 88. Hernández & Córdoba (1979) 
for Mexico 1950, 58, 63, 68, 70, 77. Baptista (1997) for Venezuela in 1976-1989. For D10 and 
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4. conclusions 
This paper offers for the first time a long-run account of Latin American 
inequality based on estimates for the top 10% and the bottom 40% income 
shares. The methodology and data have limitations, particularly the use of few 
occupational categories to calculate labour shares and lack of direct estimates 
on non-labour income. But, given the difficulties of using income tax records 
and the reduced availability of household surveys prior to 1970 or so, it is a 
valid option to shed light on long-run inequality in the region. I hope that future 
research, particularly at a country level, will improve these crude estimates 
and confirm – or reject as the case may be – the findings of this work. 
There are two historical regularities to highlight: a persistent high income 
concentration at the top 10% EAP share (receiving an average income share 
of 51.3%) and a low share of income going to the bottom 40% (13.2%), with 
the gap between both income shares experiencing a gradual increase since the 
1950s. Concentration at the top in the LA-6 is similar to that estimated in the 
Belle Epoch in rich countries. This evidence also shows the absence of a shared 
inequality levelling in the middle decades of 20th century (coinciding with the 
ISIS in the LA-6) as experienced in the rich economies. 
Skills upgrading and labour mobility were significant, picking up from the 
1950s in response to important efforts to expand public education. Those able 
to acquire more skills and move upwards in the distribution did rather better 
than the unskilled. However, at least until 2000, this process of skills upgrading 
was not enough to drive a secular decline in top 10% shares; nor a sustained 
improvement of the income share of those at the bottom. High concentration 
at the top is also a feature of recent studies based on tax records, whereas 
relatively low income shares of the bottom 40% are consistently reported in 
official household surveys since the 1980s.
The new long-term evidence confirms that the recent shared decline in in-
equality has no precedent in the 20th century; but it also shows that, as in the 
past, high concentration at the top and a relatively low-income share of the 
bottom 40% continue to be the region’s inequality trademark. With the end of 
the commodity boom – which undermines the funding of recent progressive 
social policies and employment creation – preserving recent equality gains 
calls for greater redistribution efforts. 
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AppenDix 
tAble A1: employment shAres by occupAtionAl cAtegories by DecADes
All figures in percentages (%) and are three years averages except those for 1900 based on two years. 
Sources: Benchmark figures circa 2000 are from ECLAC (2000), except for Argentina which are based 
on ILO’s data.
e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4
1900 4.0 14.6 42.4 39.0 3.5 6.7 17.3 72.5 6.0 7.0 44.9 42.1
1910 4.1 15.0 46.6 34.3 3.6 7.3 18.1 70.9 6.8 7.0 44.1 42.1
1920 4.3 15.6 44.9 35.2 3.9 7.9 19.2 69.0 5.1 6.9 46.1 41.9
1930 4.4 16.7 43.6 35.2 3.9 6.6 22.8 66.7 4.7 7.0 45.3 43.1
1940 4.6 18.4 43.4 33.6 3.9 7.7 23.9 64.5 5.5 7.3 46.2 40.9
1950 5.1 17.6 51.9 25.5 3.9 9.3 26.4 60.4 5.6 8.4 48.2 37.7
1960 6.2 18.1 54.5 21.2 4.0 10.4 30.0 55.5 7.5 8.8 51.2 32.5
1970 6.7 20.2 53.3 19.8 4.6 10.9 35.1 49.5 8.4 13.1 54.0 24.5
1980 8.3 21.4 53.0 17.3 6.5 11.8 38.3 43.4 9.6 15.9 51.8 22.7
1990 10.4 26.0 47.0 16.6 6.7 13.7 44.0 35.6 12.1 14.7 50.6 22.7
2000 12.1 25.2 47.6 15.1 7.9 13.4 46.8 31.9 13.7 17.0 47.3 22.0
2010 11.4 25.4 46.3 16.9 8.4 13.0 51.8 26.7 14.5 16.5 49.0 20.1
e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4
1900 6.2 5.1 23.2 65.5 3.3 4.9 21.0 70.8 4.1 6.4 19.8 69.6
1910 6.2 5.0 25.6 63.1 3.5 4.6 21.0 70.8 4.1 6.2 24.9 64.8
1920 6.0 4.5 28.9 60.7 3.5 4.8 20.9 70.8 4.6 6.3 29.1 60.0
1930 5.9 5.1 30.4 58.6 3.3 5.1 21.5 70.1 4.2 6.9 33.2 55.6
1940 5.7 5.4 32.0 56.9 2.9 5.6 25.5 66.0 4.2 7.5 37.9 50.3
1950 6.1 8.7 33.2 52.0 2.9 6.5 26.7 63.9 5.7 8.7 42.4 43.2
1960 7.3 9.9 33.9 48.9 4.0 8.0 32.6 55.3 5.8 11.1 45.2 37.8
1970 7.8 12.7 35.3 44.1 6.1 9.6 38.3 46.0 9.2 16.4 46.5 27.9
1980 7.5 13.9 38.8 39.8 7.2 11.4 40.8 40.5 12.5 17.4 45.9 24.3
1990 8.4 14.5 41.0 36.2 8.3 12.8 41.0 38.0 13.7 17.5 45.6 23.2
2000 9.1 14.0 40.9 36.0 9.5 14.1 43.9 32.4 12.3 17.5 46.5 23.7
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tAble A2: relAtive income rAtios by occupAtionAl cAtegories by DecADes
All figures are three years averages except those for 1900 based on two years. Income ratios are 
calculated using estimated personal income per person engaged in the denominator.
r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4
1900 10.8 0.76 0.68 0.44 7.4 1.81 1.10 0.59 7.4 1.46 0.72 0.31
1910 13.3 0.63 0.49 0.37 9.2 1.72 1.09 0.48 6.0 1.51 0.72 0.40
1920 11.7 0.70 0.60 0.33 9.2 1.25 1.05 0.49 9.4 0.96 0.58 0.45
1930 10.0 0.83 0.70 0.32 9.0 1.07 0.99 0.53 9.5 1.50 0.63 0.38
1940 9.7 0.79 0.66 0.37 9.6 1.00 0.75 0.58 8.4 0.84 0.72 0.35
1950 8.2 0.92 0.64 0.32 9.6 1.30 0.69 0.53 6.7 1.18 0.77 0.35
1960 7.5 0.82 0.58 0.35 11.1 1.25 0.70 0.39 6.6 0.99 0.65 0.26
1970 7.2 0.84 0.56 0.31 10.7 0.99 0.78 0.30 6.8 0.92 0.51 0.21
1980 6.3 0.72 0.56 0.17 8.3 0.98 0.64 0.23 6.5 0.62 0.48 0.14
1990 5.1 0.72 0.52 0.24 8.1 0.93 0.62 0.15 5.1 0.71 0.48 0.19
2000 4.4 0.76 0.50 0.24 6.1 1.20 0.65 0.16 4.9 0.60 0.42 0.16
2010 3.9 0.97 0.56 0.28 5.1 1.21 0.69 0.22 4.3 0.69 0.45 0.17
r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4
1900 6.1 2.35 1.00 0.41 8.8 1.78 1.00 0.59 7.4 2.47 1.22 0.42
1910 7.1 1.93 0.77 0.41 12.3 1.48 0.68 0.50 6.7 2.39 1.20 0.43
1920 6.9 1.43 0.94 0.42 13.5 0.97 0.42 0.56 7.6 1.77 1.06 0.38
1930 7.9 1.32 0.96 0.30 10.5 1.85 0.75 0.57 6.8 1.95 1.12 0.36
1940 8.2 1.12 0.80 0.38 10.4 1.79 0.93 0.55 9.2 1.40 0.92 0.31
1950 7.5 1.07 0.70 0.40 17.1 1.07 0.65 0.38 6.4 1.36 0.96 0.23
1960 7.3 1.09 0.60 0.33 10.6 1.05 0.78 0.42 8.2 1.14 0.66 0.26
1970 7.0 1.02 0.56 0.29 8.0 0.96 0.64 0.40 4.4 1.23 0.70 0.34
1980 6.4 0.98 0.61 0.36 7.7 0.83 0.49 0.38 4.3 1.00 0.45 0.34
1990 6.1 0.93 0.57 0.34 6.0 1.07 0.61 0.30 4.8 0.66 0.38 0.22
2000 6.0 0.91 0.54 0.30 5.7 1.01 0.57 0.19 4.0 0.99 0.53 0.34
2010 5.3 0.81 0.48 0.27 5.3 0.96 0.57 0.22 3.6 0.86 0.62 0.28
Argentina Brazil Chile
Colombia Mexico Venezuela
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notes on estimAtion proceDure AnD DAtA sources 
Economically active population shares: see Astorga (2015, Annex C).
Overall income: when available, I use national accounts estimates of house-
hold incomes (HI). When this is not available, I use data on compensation of 
employees (CE) and apply a scaling factor (SF) to derive estimates for HI. The 
SF is calculated for adjacent years with data on both HI and CE. Otherwise 
indicated, the source for HI and CE is ECLAC. To go back and forth from the 
years with HI or CE, I use the rate of growth of national income or, if not avail-
able, GDP (see Astorga, 2015, Annex C). Details by country are as follows: 
Argentina: in 1935-1962 uses CE sourced from BCRA (1976), and then ap-
plies SF=0.52 (the average SF for the remaining five countries in years with 
full data). Brazil:  HI in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 2000-2009. Between 1990 
and 2000 a SF=0.47 (the value circa 2000) is applied to CE. In 1947-1970 
CE is estimated by applying labour income shares in Frankema (2010) to GDP 
series (IBGE). Chile: HI in1970-73 and 1996-2011.  In 1960-1969 and 1974-
1995, HI uses SF=0.44 (circa 1996) applied to CE. Colombia: HI in 1970-
2011. Mexico: HI in 1993-2011. In 1970-1992, HI uses SF=0.39 (circa 1993) 
to CE. Venezuela: HI in 1960-1970 and 1978-2007.  In 1970-1978, HI uses 
SF=0.64 (circa 1978) to CE. In 1936-1960 CE is derived from private con-
sumption sourced from Valecillos (2007) and BCV; and then HI uses SF=0.67 
(circa 1960). Years between 2000 and 2003 are interpolated to avoid the 
distortion caused by the oil strike.
Wage series: these wage series were assembled with the aim of reflecting 
different skill levels and of making them as comparable as possible across the 
six countries and overtime. However, it needs to be stressed that all series are 
subject to estimation problems – with different degrees of severity depending 
on the country –with changes in definitions, sources, and coverage over time. 
Comparable wage levels are set in the core period of 1965-1980 (using the 
same source and definitions) and the series are completed back and forth us-
ing rate of growth of wage series from other sources. 
• For the unskilled workers: weighted average of the monthly national wage 
for the unskilled worker in agriculture and the minimum urban real wage from 
PREALC (1982). The weights reflect rural/urban shares in the low income EAP 
group also from PREALC. 
• For semi-skilled workers: the average hourly wage in the construction indus-
try collected in ILO’s October Enquiry, Part I. In most cases the average is cal-
culated from seven occupations (bricklayers & masons, structural iron workers, 
concrete workers, carpenters and joiners, painters, plumbers and electrical fitters).
• For relatively skilled workers: monthly wages for clerks available in ILO’s 
October Enquiry, Part II, or average wages in manufacturing from PREALC 
(1982) otherwise. 
Regarding rate of growth, Group 2 uses series of manufacturing wages (in 
most cases average monthly values) and, when this is not an option, wages 
of mid-range officers in the public sector (e.g. Colombia). Group 3, in gen-
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eral, uses average wage series in the construction sector or in retailing. For 
Argentina: average wages of non-agricultural sectors (excluding government) 
pre-1965. Chile pre-1930: wages in low productivity sectors (food and drinks 
and textiles). For Group 4 prior to1965, primarily uses rural daily wages for 
unskilled workers, complemented in some cases by wages for unskilled govern-
ment employees (e.g. Colombia). And in the post-1980 period uses a combi-
nation of rural and urban minimum wages, or average wages in retailing and 
personal services. Full details on sources and procedure will be included in a 
forthcoming publication. Please contact the author for more details.

